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ABSTRACT
Due to the current growth in air transport, the European Air Management System soon
will reach its capacity limits, thus generating a serious impact on passenger delays,
costs for airlines and CO2 emissions. To solve the problem, in 2004, the European
Commission launched the Single European Sky (SES) initiative, aiming to reform the
European airspace and the way it is managed.
The SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) Programme is the mechanism that
coordinates and concentrates all research and development activities in order to achieve
the SES goals. Two of the concepts introduced by SESAR are Collaborative Decision
Making (CDM), which aims at users to optimize their decisions in collaboration with
other partners, and Demand and Capacity Balancing (DCB), which is a process that
aims to maintain the balance between demand and capacity during the course of the
daily traffic operations.
UDPP (User Driven Priorisation Process) is a CDM-based process for DCB which
allows AUs to reflect a prioritization of flights which best respects their business
interests. It is activated during periods in which an imbalance between capacity and
demand is predicted at some local sectors of the ATM (generally due to a sudden
capacity fall caused by the presence of adverse weather not correctly forecast). The
service provider declares the available capacity and users, interacting collaboratively
and collectively with the provider, propose specific flights to update it.
UDPP is described in the SESAR documents, but in a high level of abstraction. As
no specific algorithm is available for UDPP, the challenge of the proposed project
is to better understand the different parameters and constraints that affect the DCB
process in airports in order to specify in detail a new particular concept of how the
UDPP algorithm should be.
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The project outcome is an UDPP market mechanism based on combinatorial auctions,
where users and airports can place bids for the available resources, which will be al-
located to those users who value them the most, thus achieving the maximum social
welfare possible whereas the costs derived from the potential negative externalities of
the resource allocation will be supported by all the users in an equitable way.
an UDPP market mechanism based on combinatorial auctions where users and air-
ports can "bid" for the available resources, which will be allocated to those users who
value them most, thus achieving the maximum social welfare possible whereas the
costs derived from the potential negative externalities of the resource allocation will be
supported by all the users in an equitable way.
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1. INTRODUCTION
European Air Traffic Management (ATM) is an extremely complicated system. Its
airspace is among the busiest in the world with over 33,000 flights daily, with a very
high airport density. The traffic forecasts [10] predict a growth of 2,7% from 2015 on-
wards. The 2008 peak of 10.1 million flights is forecast to be reached again in 2016 and
in 2020, 11.8 million flights, 19% more than in 2013.
The shortcomings of the European ATM system are estimated to cost billions of Euros
annually. That is a threat to the sustainable growth of the air transport sector. With-
out any change in the way that the air transport is currently managed, the European
ATM soon will reach its capacity limits, thus generating a serious impact on passenger
delays, costs for airlines and CO2 emissions.
1.1 The Single European Sky (SES)
The Single European Sky (SES) is an initiative launched by the European Commission
(EC) in 2004 to reform the European ATM. The European airspace will no longer have
national boundaries, on behalf the Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB), which are trans-
European cross-border airspaces, designed as a function of the air traffic needs, instead
of the national borders.
Besides restructuring European airspace structure, the SES key objectives are the gener-
ation of additional ATM capacity and the increase of the overall ATM system efficiency,
altogether without ever neglecting safety.
In order to meet these objectives, the EC sets a Performance Scheme, that defines the
required performance levels (compared to 2005) in the following areas.
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• Safety: Improve safety by a factor of 10.
• Capacity: Enable an increase in capacity by a factor of 3 which will also reduce
delays both on the ground and in the air.
• Cost-Effectiveness: Provide ATM services to the airspace users at a cost of at
least 50% less.
• Environmental Impact: Enable a 10% reduction in the effects flights have on the
environment.
In addition, Eurocontrol1 has been established as the European Network Manager
(NM), who assumes a set of different ATM functions, among which the most impor-
tant one with regards to this work is the Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management
(ATFCM).
1.1.1 The SESAR Programme
A new ATM infrastructure needs to be deployed in Europe in order to achieve SES
objectives and targets. It requires active and constructive cooperation in a coordinated
and synchronized manner between a wide range of stakeholders. The SESAR (Single
European Sky ATM Research) initiative is the mechanism which seeks to coordinate
and concentrate all EU research and development activities in ATM. It is the techno-
logical dimension of SES, supported by state-of-the-art and innovative technology.
SESAR is organized in three phases:
• Definition Phase (2005-2008). During this period, the European ATM Master
Plan [17] was delivered, in which the technological steps and the modernization
for the implementation of a new ATM concept are defined. It was co-financed by
the EC and Eurocontrol.
• Development Phase (2008-2016). This phase was managed by SESAR Joint Un-
dertaking, a European public-private partnership, in which the required new
1Eurocontrol is the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation. Founded in 1960, it is an
international organization working for seamless, pan-European air traffic management. Eurocontrol is
a civil organization and currently has 40 member states. Its headquarters are in Haren, City of Brussels.
4
1.1. THE SINGLE EUROPEAN SKY (SES)
generation of systems and components was produced as defined in the previ-
ous phase. SESAR Joint Undertaking is the guarantee for a single management
structure for the project, as well as a governance model associating all actors in-
volved.
• Deployment Phase (2014-2020). It will seek to build the new infrastructure at
a wide scale both in Europe and in partner countries. This will be carried out
under the responsibility of the industry.
By making full use of existing and newly developed technologies, SESAR concept is
based on the following new key features:
• Moving from Airspace to 4D Trajectory Management, reducing the constraints
of airspace organization to a minimum. The key concept is the 4D Trajectory,
under which the Airspace Users (AU) and Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP)
define together, through a collaborative process, their optimum flight trajectory.
• Network Collaborative Management & Dynamic Capacity Balancing. Intro-
duction of the Network Operations Plan (NOP), a dynamic updated plan that
ensures a common view of the network situation. 4D Trajectories are used in
ATFCM, by means of the concept of Business Trajectories (BT). Definition of the
CDM (Collaborative Decision Making) concept and UDPP (User Driven Priori-
sation Process) protocol. UDPP is a process or protocol activated during periods
in which an imbalance between capacity and demand is predicted at some local
sectors of the ATM (generally due to a sudden capacity fall caused by the pres-
ence of adverse weather not correctly forecast). The service provider declares
the available capacity and users, interacting collaboratively and collectively
with the provider, propose specific flights to update it [11].
• Airport Integration & Throughput. Full integration of airport operations as part
of ATM and the planning process. A key enabler for a closer integration of net-
work and airport operations is the implementation of Airport Collaborative Deci-
sion Making (A-CDM). A-CDM improves ATFCM at airports by reducing delays
and improving the predictability and efficiency. It allows each partner to opti-
mize decisions in collaboration with other partners, knowing their preferences
and constraints as well as the actual and planned future situation.
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• System Wide Information Management (SWIM) [8], securely connecting all the
ATM stakeholders, guaranteeing that they share the same data. It consists of
standards, infrastructure and governance enabling the management of ATM in-
formation and its exchange between qualified parties. It will enable the stake-
holders in the European ATM community to collaborate in a federated manner,
at the pan-European, regional and local levels. Information will be available to
all parties, except if specific policies restrict access to it. In other words, SWIM
can be understood as a future European ATM intranet.
• Conflict Management & Automation. ANSP and pilots will be assisted by new
automated functions to reduce their workload and easing to handle complex
decision-making processes. Conflict Detection & Resolution (CD&R) [16] tools
will be used to organize the ATM in a safe way, both in strategic and in tactical
phase.
• Traffic Synchronization. Integration of Departure Manager (DMAN) and Sur-
face Manager (SMAN) systems at airports and their collaboration with Arrival
Management systems (AMAN) to optimize the sequencing of aircraft surface
movements, arrivals and departures at airports.
In order to achieve the target concept and key features, SESAR is divided in three
phases, called Steps. These steps are capability-based and not fixed in time. Each step
brings the ATM system closer to the target concept.
• Step 1: Time Based Operations. It is the basis for the implementation of the
SESAR concept and it focuses on flight efficiency, predictability and the environ-
ment. It introduces time prioritization for arrivals at airports by initial Trajectory-
Based operations, through the use of temporal landmarks. Datalink is widely
used.
• Step 2: Trajectory Based Operations. It defines a trajectory-based ATM system
where the AU optimize their Business Trajectories and define their priorities in
the network. SWIM is used for 4D trajectory management and air/ground tra-
jectory exchange to enable tactical planning and de-confliction.
• Step 3: Performance Based Operations. It will achieve the high performance
needed to satisfy the SESAR target concept, through the total use of SWIM and
collaboratively planned network operations with UDPP.
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1.2 Demand & Capacity Balancing Through UDPP
Two of the ATM changes proposed by SESAR are the Collaborative Decision Making
and the Dynamic Capacity Balancing.
The concept of Collaborative Decision Making introduced in SESAR aims at users
to optimize their decisions in collaboration with other partners, knowing their prefer-
ences and constraints, improving predictability and efficiency. In this context, all users
progressively share more and more precise data to build the NOP, a common traffic
and operational environment picture, that can be updated in real time and must reflect
any changes that may affect the ATM operations.
Demand & Capacity Balancing (DCB) is a process that takes place on the day of op-
erations and aims to maintain the balance between demand and capacity during the
course of daily traffic operations. Through the life-cycle of the flights, the traffic de-
mand and capacity are monitored. When an imbalance occurs, capacity shortfall sce-
narios are collaboratively solved and reimplemented.
UDPP is a CDM-based process for DCB which allows AUs to reflect a prioritization
of flights which best respects their business interests. It is activated during periods in
which an imbalance between capacity and demand is predicted at some local sectors
of the ATM (generally due to a sudden capacity fall caused by the presence of adverse
weather not correctly forecast). The service provider declares the available capacity
and users, interacting collaboratively and collectively with the provider, propose spe-
cific flights to update it.
Since SESAR Definition Phase is a dynamic and changing process, UDPP definition
in the different Steps is slightly different. The documents containing the defini-
tions of all the concepts introduced in each SESAR Step are the Concept of Operations
(ConOps) documents [7, 9]. Only the Step 1 and Step 2 ConOps have been published
so far. Next, the different definitions of UDPP are described.
UDPP in Step 1. UDPP is first used to address reduced airport capacity, with a pri-
mary focus on addressing departure congestion. However, it is also available in any
normal situation on departure and arrival, and even en-route. It is directly linked to
7
1.3. MOTIVATION OF THE RESEARCH: DESIGN OF A MARKET BASED UDPP
MECHANISM
slot allocations in the Network Operations planning during periods of reduced ca-
pacity. The CDM process mainly relies on the existing system (Slot Swapping) using
current techniques adapted to SWIM-compliant information sharing.
In all cases, NM assesses the impact of the AU’s UDPP proposals on the network,
makes sure that all concerned parties are aware of them and react with new measures
in order to minimize the impact of the proposal on the network. Two roles are defined
in UDPP Step 1:
• UDPP Arbitration at Airport Level. In case of departures from the same airport,
NM delegates to the Airport the responsibility to make sure that the agreed UDPP
rules are respected and that an acceptable solution is available in due time.
• UDPP Referee at Network Level. NM publishes the results and facilitates collab-
orative dialogue to resolve traffic DCB issues. In particular, it records the results
of UDPP requests over time, in accordance to the UDPP principles and rules.
UDPP in Step 2. As in Step 1, UDPP is primarily for use during periods of capacity
constraint, but available at all times in order to support business efficiency. The con-
cept of business efficiency is first mentioned in Step 2. UDPP is available at both
planning and execution phases and is enabled by NM.
It is an input into the DCB process and the management of sequences with the aim
of respecting at best the priorities and business interests of AUs. The concept of se-
quences is also new in Step 2. It also mentions that AMAN/DMAN is linked to DCB
and UDPP through the use of automation and decision making support tools. AUs
provide a traffic prioritization order to determine their preferred way to match with
the new capacity constraints.
1.3 Motivation of the Research: Design of a Market Based
UDPP Mechanism
The SESAR ConOps documents provide high level guidance and serve as a common
reference for all operationally related SESAR tasks, describing the ATM operations
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foreseen in Europe so that all the airspace users gain common understanding. UDPP
is described in the ConOps documents, but in a high level of abstraction. As no specific
algorithm is available for UDPP, the challenge of the proposed project is to better
understand the different parameters and constraints that affect the DCB process in
airports in order to specify in detail an own concept of how the UDPP algorithm
should be.
Seven different indicators, called Key Performance Areas (KPA), are used in SESAR in
order to verify compliance with the performance achievable by the SESAR operational
concept. These KPA are Capacity, Flexibility, Predictability, Efficiency, Cost Effec-
tiveness, Safety and Environmental Sustainability. The innovative concept of CDM,
and more precisely UDPP, will generate an important impact on all SESAR KPAs, with
an improvement specially on Capacity, Flexibility and Efficiency and also introducing
the concepts of Equity and Fairness. In my point of view, UDPP will be of special in-
terest in the target ATM, specially at airports, as it will be an important part of a new
paradigm in which users will be involved in sharing their priorities, democratically
and seeking network efficiency.
1.4 Objectives
The main objective of this project is to design an algorithm for the UDPP protocol
based in an ATM resources market system, so that these resources can be allocated
to those airspace users who value them most, thus achieving the most socially ben-
eficial resource allocation.
In order to achieve the main objective, a series of partial objectives are defined. These
will form a set of short-term milestones, necessary to define an efficient methodology
to face the problem. Next, the partial objectives of the project are listed.
1. Study the concepts introduced in SESAR and become familiar with how the op-
erations will be in the SES, in order to get a model that can be coupled in those
requirements and limitations.
2. Identify the parameters that affect in a resources reallocation, the involved parties
and other aspects to consider.
9
1.5. PROJECT SCOPE & DOCUMENT STRUCTURE
3. Analyze different economic theories and justify that a market mechanism is the
best method to use in the algorithm design. Describe the threats that deviate a
market from the optimal result.
4. Understand the difference between discrete and time-spatial resources and en-
sure that economic theories are still met.
5. Analyze the concepts of efficiency, equity and fairness and study how to consider
and ensure them in the model
6. Specify the market performance and its variables and parameters.
7. Check the validity of the model by developing different case studies.
8. Analyze the results and make conclusions.
9. Define the model limitations and the future work.
1.5 Project Scope & Document Structure
SESAR provides slightly different definitions of UDPP in Step 1 and Step 2 ConOps
Documents. In Step 1, UDPP is defined to primarily be used in airports, specially
in departure congestion. It defines different arbitration roles for airport and en-route
supervision.
In Step 2, UDPP definition is broader. UDPP is available at any situation, in airports
and en-route, in strategic and tactical phases.
This project considers that the greatest potential of the UDPP protocol lies in moments
of congestion, after an unexpected perturbation has produced an imbalance between
demand and capacity, specially at airports in a tactical level. Therefore, the proposed
model will only consider the case of UDPP activated under NM enablement, being
used for the resolution of mismatches between demand and capacity for arrivals at
airports at a tactical level. The algorithm will be a utility-based market for alloca-
tion of resources (landing slots) through a combinatorial auction. This model may be
adaptable to other flight stages like departures or en-route and also to strategic phase,
with the convenient changes. The project will only cover the modeling stage, present-
ing a theoretical model of the algorithm.
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In Chapter 2, a detailed Literature Review is presented, with a comparison between
the current ATM system and the ATM expected in SES, an analysis on the different
sources of uncertainty that may lead to the appearance of a perturbation provoking
the activation of UDPP and a review on the different concepts necessary for the design
of a market.
In Chapter 3, the Design of the Algorithm is detailed. First, the variables and param-
eters are described, and then, the market mechanism rules. Next, the different steps in
the algorithm design phase are described in detail, such as the incentive alignment for
collaborative behavior or agents, the calculation of feasible landing sequences, the
congestion fees and compensation refunds used to guarantee an equitable situation
and finally, the cash flows between users.
Chapter 4 presents 2 different Case Studies to facilitate the understanding of the algo-
rithm. The first one describes the normal algorithm performance and the second one,
a situation in which one user places false bids in order to get a resource.
Finally, in Chapter 5, the final conclusions are done.
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2.1 New ATM Concepts Introduced by SESAR
At first glance, current and target ATM systems may seem similar. However, opera-
tional and conceptual changes are huge. With the aim of showing the key differences,
an abstract of the flight planning process in both systems is presented.
The current ATM planning begins with the publishing of the available network re-
sources (airways and sectors) capacity, by the use of information derived from long
term predictions. It determines the maximum airspace capacity at the day of opera-
tions. Airlines use this information to issue their Flight Plans (FPL). FPL is a document
that, regarding a scheduled flight or a part of it, is submitted to ANSP to inform that the
flight is going to take place. Contains information about aircraft identification, origin
and destination, waypoints, etc. It must be approved before the flight execution.
Eurocontrol CFMU (Central Flow Management Unit) is responsible for matching ca-
pacity and demand, in order to avoid unsafe overloaded sectors. CFMU makes a pre-
diction of the airspace demand from the information of each individual FPL and
compares it to the pre-declared capacity released by ANSP. Those predictions are
refined as the day of operations becomes closer and the quantity and quality of in-
formation increases. If any imbalance between the predicted traffic and the available
capacity is detected at the day of operations in a sector, CFMU applies regulations
(delays, re-routings or flight level changes) to some selected flights. This selection is
not made taking into account the ATC (Air Traffic Control) sectors workload.
ANSP are responsible of the ATC function, preserving safety distances among all air-
craft during the flight execution, guiding and facilitating the navigation of each indi-
vidual aircraft through the airspace sectors. ANSP are also responsible of CD&R at
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a tactical level, usually with an advance of 20 minutes maximum and with no global
ATM perspective of how the decisions made at a local sector may affect the rest of the
network through domino effects.
However, in the target ATM, one of the fundamental elements is the 4D Business Tra-
jectory Management. The traffic flow management is replaced by trajectories manage-
ment. The BT represents the intended trajectory in a time-space dimension for each
flight. It evolves out of a collaborative planning process through its life-cycle, in 3
sequential phases:
• Business Development Trajectory (BDT). It is internally generated by the AU
based on their business planning goals and their own optimization parameters.
BDT are not shared with the rest of the ATM community, as their development
may start even years before the day of operations.
• Shared Business Trajectory (SBT). It evolves out of a BDT and is shared for plan-
ning and negotiation purposes with all involved stakeholders. As long as some
potential constraints and discrepancies between the network and the SBT may
be detected, AU are involved in the process of DCB, by modifying the trajectory.
This phase can start several months before the day of operations and finishes a
few minutes before the flight execution.
• Reference Business Trajectory (RBT). It is the one that the AU agrees to fly and
the ANSP and Airport agree to facilitate. The RBT becomes instantiated before
the first ATC clearance, just minutes before the flight execution. Since the RBT
is a goal to be achieved, it will be progressively authorized. Thus, RBT may
evolve during flight execution in order to reflect all the applicable clearances
and constraints of current state of the network. The progressive authorizations
made over an RBT are the 4D contracts. Before flight time, the RBT is published
by airline and accessed by aircraft. When the take-off time is known, the first
airborne segment of the RBT will be cleared through a 4D contract. Successive
segments of RBT will be progressively cleared by means of new 4D contracts.
RBT may be recalculated or updated from ground or air, for different reasons
(separation provision, sequencing, new AUs needs, weather, changing arrival
constraints or inability to comply with RBT).
Figure 2.1 shows how Business Trajectory evolves over time and how it is used in the
different planning phases.
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Figure 2.1: Business Trajectory Life-Cycle.
4D Trajectories are also composed of different temporal landmarks, either imposed
by ATM or calculated by AU, which control the operation of the flight through the
trajectory. This landmarks or milestones are introduced in SESAR Step 1 (Time Based
Operations) [7].
• Target Time of Arrival (TTA). An ATM computed arrival time. It is not a con-
straint but a progressively refined planning time that is used to coordinate be-
tween arrival and departure management applications.
• Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA). The time computed by the FMS (Flight Man-
agement System)2 for the flight arriving at a point related to the destination air-
port.
• Controlled Time of Arrival (CTA). An ATM imposed time constraint on a de-
fined merging point associated to an arrival runway.
• Controlled Time Over (CTO). An ATM imposed time constraint over a point.
Similar to CTA but used en-route.
A possible problem is that the trajectory held in aircraft systems and the trajectory cal-
culated for that flight by the ground ATM system may be different because of limited
2An integrated system, consisting of an airborne sensor, receiver and computer with both navigation
and aircraft performance databases, which provides performance and navigation guidance to a display
and automatic flight control system.
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reconciliation or different assumptions, purposes, sophistication or performance mod-
els. However, in SESAR, both aircraft and ground systems will be using shared data,
including trajectories, to build and maintain a common understanding of trajectory
evolution, via SWIM.
During flight execution, both the executed and predicted trajectories will slightly de-
viate from the RBT, as it was computed using forecasted winds, which include a level
of uncertainty and may differ to actual winds. Trajectory Management Requirements
(TMR) specify the requirements on the aircraft to share the updated trajectory in the
event of that the flight detects a deviation from previous predictions on a cyclical basis.
It will allow to set time-spatial deviation tolerances (buffers) or even, CD&R process if
necessary.
Airspace stakeholders will use the NOP as a single portal access to ATM information.
AU will declare their trajectory intentions and preferences and ANSP will declare their
expected capacity and resources. NM will facilitate dialogue to resolve demand and
capacity imbalances in a collaborative manner. In case of a sudden capacity shortfall
the NM initiates a UDPP process, allowing resource trading among stakeholders to
solve the imbalance situation. NM can impose decisions in case of no agreement is
reached in timely-critical situations.
2.2 Uncertainty in ATM
UDPP protocol will be activated during periods of reduced capacity, when a pertur-
bation unexpectedly affects the system, generally provoking a reduction of capacity in
the ATM or in particular local sectors and, as a consequence, impeding the normal
execution of operations as scheduled. That means that every situation has a compo-
nent of uncertainty, that should be understood in order to keep track of the different
sources of uncertainty that may lead to the occurrence of a perturbation. Several au-
thors and researchers have conducted studies on uncertainty, but using different ap-
proaches. There is a lack of a common language that facilitates collaboration towards
common objectives and dissemination of their work. Therefore, the ATM scientific
community has recently provided with a framework that eases the study of how differ-
ent levels and sources of uncertainty affect the ATM system [6]. Five different sources
of uncertainty are described, arranged in a hierarchical way.
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Figure 2.2: Relations Between Different Sources of Uncertainty.
• Airborne Trajectory Uncertainty. Only the airborne phase of the 4D trajectory is
considered. It quantifies potential feasible deviations of the aircraft with respect
to the planned nominal 4D trajectory. The model used to determine the most
probable position of the aircraft is the region of confidence, whose center lies at
the expected value of the position of the aircraft and includes around it a region
of space where the aircraft could be located with a certain degree of probability.
• Flight Uncertainty. It encompasses all the uncertainties present at the differ-
ent stages of the flight (Strategic, Pre-Departure, Gate-to-Gate and Post-Arrival.
Flight delay is a very important phenomenon that affects and propagates to other
scales.
• Traffic Uncertainty. Trajectories interact with management procedures, sepa-
ration rules and uncertain atmospheric conditions. This generates a dynamic,
rapidly changing environment where air traffic control has to take decisions try-
ing to fulfill the conflicting objectives of optimization and safety.
• Network Uncertainty. An air transport network can be summarized as a set of
airports and flights, represented by a graph with airports as nodes and flights
as directed links between those nodes. Their structure and relations are irregular,
uncertain and dynamically evolving in time. Uncertainties in all the other inferior
levels may lead to a perturbation in the network level, creating domino effects.
• Weather Uncertainty. It is situated at the highest level not because it encom-
passes all of the above, but because it can affect them all. It is the most arbitrary
and difficult to foresee source of uncertainty.
Figure 2.2 whows the relations between the different sources of uncertainty.
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The article, in addition to the sources of uncertainty, also defines its scope. It distin-
guishes three levels:
• Microscale - A single flight. Of particular interest within this scale is the study of
the aircraft trajectory.
• Mesoscale - Air traffic. This intermediate scale allows focus on a given area that
contains many individual aircraft that interact among themselves following a
given set of rules, for instance a Terminal Maneuvering Area (TMA) or sector.
• Macroscale - Air transport network. This scale integrates the state of the various
ATM elements and allows focus on the network properties, giving a high-level
view of the system.
UDPP will be activated after the occurrence of a perturbation, whose uncertainty
mainly will be affecting the ATM system in the Mesoscale scope. The lack of runway
capacity is the primary constraint in the busiest airports in Europe and the available
capacity at runways is often reduced because of the presence of bad weather, thus
generating important delays on the traffic affected. Thus, this project will focus on
airports, as these are the ATM’s main bottleneck.
2.3 Market Mechanisms for UDPP
A capacity drop in an airport can be summarized as a reallocation of landing slots
or landing times, where some users will get the right of landing at the airport, until
capacity is fulfilled, and the rest will be forced to divert to their alternative airports.
Several authors have conducted studies on the use of market mechanisms to allocate
aeronautical resources.
In 1982, Rassenti et. al. [15] proposed a sealed-bid combinatorial auction for the al-
location of airport time slots to competing airlines. This procedure permits airlines
to submit various contingency bids for combinations of individual airport landing or
take-off slots. Later in 2006, Ball et. al. [2] established the necessary evolutions in the
system design in order to keep meeting the goals of economic viability, safety and effi-
ciency. The article explains how market-clearing mechanisms might be able to rectify
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many of the shortcomings of the current system. More recently, in 2009, Ranieri et. al.
[14] described a market mechanism based on auctions to assign ATFM delays to flights
at a tactical level, when a mismatch between demand and capacity is detected for a
specific system resource.
In order to design a market mechanism to implement the UDPP algorithm, the charac-
teristics and performance of markets should be analyzed. The first concept to under-
stand is the Pareto optimality [3]. An allocation is Pareto Optimal if there is no way
to arrange production or reallocate goods so that someone is made better off without
making someone else worse off. This theory also stands that individuals are the best
judges of their own welfare. Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics [18] stand
that under certain conditions, an allocation achieved by a market economy will be
Pareto Optimal. However, there might be some circumstances that deviate allocation
from the optimum.
• Externalities. When a consumption or production of an agent changes the pro-
duction or consumption possibilities of other agents. Externalities can be good
or bad.
• Asymmetric Information. Occurs when information is dispersed in society.
• Bounded Rationality. In decision making, individuals rationality is limited by
the available information, their cognitive limitations and the finite time they have
to make decide.
• Market Incompleteness. When markets do not supply a good or a service, even
when its supply cost is lower than what users are willing to pay.
In order to design a market whose result is the optimum, or as close as possible to
the optimum, the threats that deviate the result from the Pareto optimum must be
understood. Coase [5] claims that if the ownership of the goods is clear and the trans-
action cost of reaching a contract between the parties is small or nonexistent, the
parties will reach a private agreement that is socially beneficial. The social optimum
is achieved regardless of how the property rights are distributed, they simply change
who pays and who charges. If agents are not able to reach an agreement, that is a sign
that externalities are smaller than transaction costs. Then, externalities in the market
can be minimized or even eliminated if the transaction costs are low enough and the
remaining externalities are compensated.
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With the use of SWIM [8], transaction costs between parties wishing to collabo-
rate will be practically null. As the Coase Theorem argues, under these conditions
the agents will reach agreements resulting in the social optimum. Secondly, the use
of SWIM also allows the reduction in the impact of other threats. There will be no
asymmetric information, as all the ATM users will have the same updated and veri-
fied information. Also, bounded rationality will be reduced, as there is no asymmetric
information.
Any aircraft flying must always land, thus market incompleteness is not an option in
the proposed model. Even when access to saturated or congested resources is struc-
tured through a market system, in which resources will be assigned to users who value
them the most, no user will stop receiving service, for logical reasons. It is true that de-
viating an aircraft to an alternative airport will produce externalities, but taking into
account that the market meets the Coase Theorem, the users that are outside of the
resource access are the ones who generate less impact in the social benefit (lower exter-
nalities). These remaining externalities can be reduced by the use of compensations.
In economics, utility is a measure of satisfaction. It is the concept that explains the
reason why the consumers acquire goods of any kind, they assign them a value. As-
suming that this measure is valid, it makes sense the fact of increasing or decreasing
utility, and thereby explaining economic behavior in terms of attempts to increase the
utility [4].
Utilitarianism is an economic theory that established the maximization of utility as a
moral criterion for the organization of society. From this point of view, it is suggested
that an economy is efficient if it produces the highest satisfaction for participants in its
activities [12].
Using a utility-based market, it can be stated that a set of goods can be optimally
allocated to the users who value them the most. Furthermore, if a compensation
system is used, where users who have been assigned a good, and consequently having
more utility, compensate users who did not obtain a good, a fair and equitable situation
can be achieved.
In an airport congestion situation, besides expanding resources, the problem can be
solved by allocating them more efficiently. Current system for airport resource alloca-
tion encourages waste of resources, as slot allocation uses First Planned, First Served
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(FPFS) policy. Aircraft operators, who place different values on airport resources, can-
not differentiate themselves by indicating the price they are willing to pay to use the
airport (their utility).
A comparison can be used to better understand the concept, for instance, between a
business flight and a recreational flight. Assume that the business flight hopes to land
at an airport in order to close a multi-million business transaction. Meanwhile, assume
that the recreational one has decided to land at the same airport at the same time to pick
up a drink. With the first come, first served policy, so long as the recreational flight gets
in line to land before the business flight, it could delay the business flight in the air or
even cause its diversion to an alternative airport. This outcome is true regardless of
whether the business flight places a much higher value on the same landing time [13].
When an airport becomes congested, equity and fairness would be better served if
airports employed some method to identify the value placed on use by all aircraft and
used this information to arrange the queue, prioritizing higher values.
Once analyzed the concepts and technologies that enable the use of A-CDM, and con-
sequently UDPP, for the allocation of ATM resources and the economic parameters that
affect the design of a market, it can be concluded that a market system can achieve a
result close to the optimum. Note that the economic theories discussed are valid for
discrete goods and instead, the model proposed in this project consists of time-spatial
resources. Even so, the main bases of the theories are thus validating the model and in
its design the possible differences will be taken into account.
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3. DESIGN OF THE ALGORITHM
3.1 Definition of Variables and Parameters
Let assume an airport A in which a capacity drop occurs and UDPP protocol is ac-
tivated, which will to be active for the time window (TW) between instants tstart
and tend. Users must renegotiate their landing slots within TW limits. Figure 3.3
shows how a new temporal dimension is created, as TW first instant is set to 1 while
tstart and tend are in function of current time (UTC time). Then, TW can be defined
as TW = {1, ..., t}, where t is the TW duration in seconds. In this model, TW time
is discretized in units of 1 second of duration, that can be considered as different
spatial-temporal resources. These discrete portions of time are referred in this model
as Time− space Valuable Units (TVUs).
The set of flights that are arriving to A and are affected by the capacity reduction is
represented by F = {1, ..., f}, where f is the number of flights. Each flight will have a
RBT associated, with an arrival time constraint to accomplish, i.e., a TTA or CTA. Not
all of these RBTs will be able to be met, as some flights will get the right of landing at A,
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Figure 3.3: Dual time dimension between current time and the UDPP Time Window.
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Figure 3.4: Matrix of separations.
getting a landing slot allocated during renegotiation, and some others will be diverted
to their alternative airports. In this model, it is considered that the beginning of any
landing slot can start at any discrete second, i.e., at any TVU, which are the resources
that will be traded in the UDPP market, since a landing slot slot will be composed
by a bunch of TVUs. The end of the landing slot will depend on the minimum safety
time-based distance separation required between the actual landing aircraft (leader)
and the aircraft landing next ( f ollower). Separations between pairs of aircraft will be
stored in a matrix called Sep, whose size is f × f . Each element of the matrix is defined
as Sepij, ∀ij∈ F, where i represents the leader aircraft and j the follower aircraft. Note
that the diagonal of the matrix contains no values, since a flight can not be paired with
itself in a landing sequence. Figure 3.4 describes the matrix of time-based minimum
separation between pairs of aircraft.
In this model, the property of the time-space resources is assumed to be of the airport.
However, for the airport to be able to operate in the ATM system, the NM may force
to obey some regulations on the use and allocation of landing slots, for safety reasons.
If a traffic mix with different aircraft models and weight categories is considered, the
required time-based separations between flights will lead to different runway capac-
ities, depending on the landing sequence executed. Thus, since the airport charges a
price for each slot, the revenues of the airport may be affected by the priorisation of the
landing sequences. This model proposes that airports should also participate in the
negotiation of the landing slots. The prices charged to flights for the landing slots, i.e.,
LndFeei, ∀i ∈ F, are previously established and usually depend on the weight category
of the aircraft.
Another constraint in the allocation process is the range of each flight. It is a temporal
constraint and represents the farthest instant until the aircraft can continue flying safely
and also the earliest instant at which the aircraft could reach A by increasing its speed
or changing the trajectory. It will depend on multiple factors as remaining fuel, weight,
22
3.1. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS








Figure 3.5: Representation of a flight range (aircraft cannot land between tstart and
ELTi, but can land in tend or even after).
winds, etc. The range of a flight will be used to know the autonomy of the aircraft and
to determine its feasible landing times. The time limits that determine the range of
a flight are ELTi (Earliest Landing Time of flight i, ∀i∈ F) and LLTi (Latest Landing
Time of flight i, ∀i∈ F). Note that a flight range may exceed the TW limits if the
aircraft can arrive before UDPP activation or after the protocol is stopped and situation
has returned to normal conditions. Figure 3.5 shows an example.
The monetary unit used by users to submit their bids for those resources will be any
common currency that allows representing their utility valued for each of the TVUs
of TW assuming they land at each respective TVU and after taking into account the
payment of the LndFee. For simplicity, this model assumes that the utility curves of
users are concave and continuous, although the model is flexible to any shape. AUs
utility is obtained from their own business optimization function, which will be differ-
ent for every user and even for every flight. This function is a very sensitive and confi-
dential information, so users will not be willing to share their optimization function.
The method proposed in this model, to protect the confidentiality of information, is
that users provide directly the rating for each of the TVUs, regardless of the method
used by them to obtain such information. The utility of a user i for a specific time step
j is defined as Ui→j , ∀i ∈ F , ∀j ∈ TW . The set of utilities of a user will be stored in
a vector, referred as Bidi = {Ui→1, ...,Ui→t}, which represents the bid of the user for
the resources. Figure 3.6 shows an example of how the vector of utilities of a user is
created and initialized.
Considering the range restriction, it makes no sense that users provide a utility for
those TVUs in which they can not land. Thus, Bidi vector will be marked with × in
those positions outside the time range. An example is shown in Figure 3.7.
Some users may not get a resource allocated and they will be forced to divert to a
time window posterior to TW or to an alternative airport. Therefore, the model must
include the costs associated with not being able to land at A. The cost of not landing
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Figure 3.6: Example of a vector of utilities creation.
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Figure 3.7: Utilities within different ranges.
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in an airport can be equivalently described as the utility of diverting to an alternative
airport (which not necessarily must be negative) and is identified as DivAlti, ∀i ∈ F.
As the airport will also participate in the negotiation process, its utility also has to be
taken into account. The airport will directly provide the utility that perceives from a
series of landing sequences (LSeq). Landing sequences will be expressed as a list of
landing slots, which are referred as (i→ j), where i is a flight and j its TVU associated
(the start time of the landing slot). Thus, a sequence could be LSeq = [(i → j), (k →
l)...].
Utility perceived by the airport for each sequence will be the amount received from
the fees charged to flights included in the sequence and it is described as UApt. The
landing sequences are suggested by the AMAN and are optimal from the point of
view of the airport internal business logic. However, some sequences which could be
socially beneficial for the system, may remain outside the airport evaluation, if these
are not covered by the AMAN optimization function. Thus, some sequences gener-
ated from the preferences expressed by the AU will be provided to be assessed by
the airport.
The sudden loss of capacity in the airport might generate costs to all the airspace users
and also to the airport, thus causing a loss of social welfare in relation to the situation
previous to the loss of capacity. For that reason, the model includes a compensation
system, where the winners of the auction pay a congestion fee (CongFeei, ∀i ∈ F)
to use the congested resources, which will be used to compensate users with negative
externalities, by use of a compensation refund (Compi, ∀i ∈ F). The compensation
system is described in detail in Section 3.5.
Table 3.1 presents a summary of all the defined variables and parameters.
3.2 Market Mechanism Rules
Once presented and described the variables and parameters that will be used in the
model, the rules and information flows that will regulate the market must be detailed.
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Summary of Variables and Parameters
Variable Description
Bidi Bid (vector of utilities) of user i, ∀i ∈ F. Bidi = {Ui→1, ..., Ui→t}.
Compi Compensation refund received by user i, ∀i ∈ F.
CongFeei Congestion fee paid by user i, ∀i ∈ F.
DivAlti Utility of flight i for diverting to an alternative airport, ∀i ∈ F.
ELTi Earliest Landing Time of flight i, ∀i ∈ F.
f Number of affected flights.
F Set of affected flights. F = {1, ..., f }.
LLTi Latest Landing Time of flight i, ∀i ∈ F.
LSeq Landing sequence.
LndFeei Landing fee for flight i, ∀i ∈ F.
Sepij Time-based separation between flights i (leader) and j (follower).
t TW duration in seconds.
tend UDPP end time in UTC format.
tstart UDPP start time in UTC format.
TVU Time-space Valuable Unit.
TW UDPP Time Window. TW = {1, ..., t}.
UApt Utility of airport for a landing sequence.
Ui→j Utility of user i for TVU j, ∀i ∈ F , ∀j ∈ TW.
Table 3.1: Summary of Variables and Parameters.
UDPP will be activated when a capacity shortage occurs. The perturbation causing
the capacity drop may have several origins, like a sudden storm, weather not correctly
forecasted, accidents or incidents, infrastructure problems or maintenance, etc. The
probability of occurrence of perturbations will have different scopes and sources of
uncertainty. When the perturbation is detected the NM is responsible for evaluating
the situation and considering the need for activation of the protocol.
UDPP activation will be published in the NOP, as it will be a new state of the net-
work, and also broadcasted to all users and stakeholders, via SWIM. NM acts as an
arbitrator or supervisor. Although UDPP is a collaborative negotiation process, the al-
location result must be finally revised and approved by the NM, to ensure it complies
with the safety principles and avoid compromising the proper operation and perfor-
mance of the network.
The first step is the UDPP activation announcement and TW limits setting, and once
the temporal range is defined, the set of users affected F can be determined. When they
are informed of the situation, the process of calculating their utilities must be started.
Each user will use their own secret business optimization function and initialize a
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Figure 3.8: Information Flows in the UDPP Process
vector of utilities (Bidi) with the results of their computations. This vector Bidi will be
submitted to NM and it represents the user’s bid for each of the TVUs available, i.e.,
the amount they are willing to pay for landing at each of these instants.
Alongside, the airport must also begin a computation process. Using its AMAN, it
must calculate a set of landing sequences which are optimal from the point of view
of the airport. These sequences will have to be evaluated and then assigned an airport
utility (UApt), along with another set of sequences that will be provided by the NM,
which would be calculated from the preferences expressed by users. The entire set of
sequences, along with their associated utilities, will be returned to NM, and represents
the bid of the airport.
The NM, once has collected the information from the users and the airport, is able to
allocate the resources to users and provide the final landing sequence. To do that, the
total utility or welfare associated to each available sequence is calculated, and then,
sequences are sorted as a function of its associated utility. Thus, the chosen landing
sequence will be the one with a greater social utility. The final decision will be pub-
lished in the NOP.
Figure 3.8 shows a schematic summary of the information flows in the proposed UDPP
27
3.3. INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT FOR COLLABORATIVE BEHAVIOR OF THE
MARKET AGENTS
model. Note how users fill Bidi vectors from their utility function, creating their bid for
each TVU. This information is then submitted to the NM, which creates, a set of land-
ing sequences from the preferences expressed by users. Alongside, the AMAN creates
sequences that are optimum from the point of view of the airport. Note that such
sequences will determine how many aircraft/slots can be fit in TW, as well as their
duration, order and the flight that gets allocated each landing slot. Once all sequences
are created, the airport assesses each sequence and associates them an utility. Finally,
the NM with utilities from users and the airport chooses the sequence that results in a
higher social welfare/total utility.
3.3 Incentive Alignment for Collaborative Behavior of the
Market Agents
This model will assign the TVU resources to the users that value them the most, but to
be valid, the valorations and information provided by users and the airport must be
real (i.e., they tell the truth). There are at least three main forces that preserve an user
from deviating from cooperative and collaborative behavior.
• The goodwill towards CDM. It is a powerful force to support cooperation and it
has been vital in the process of design and development of the new paradigms in
ATM. However, in a long term perspective, it is too weak, given the competitive-
ness within the industry.
• The Peer Pressure. Concept described in the Contestability Theory [1]. This the-
ory states that an oligopoly company will never raise its prices too high to attract
market entries nor cut its prices too low to provoke price wars in other markets.
An user will keep a cooperative behavior to avoid non-cooperative reprisals from
competitors.
• Supervision. The NM will act as a supervisor or arbitrator on top of the system,
so decisions in the negotiation process will be monitored by the NM.
Despite these forces, in the long term the only method to keep users within a collabo-
rative behavior is to align individual user’s interests with the interest of the overall
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system. The fairness policies adopted by the use of Congestion Fees and Compensa-
tion Refunds are a key element for guaranteeing collaboration among users and en-
suring the disclosure of true information. Socialization of the costs allows the system
to always reach an equitable situation, that, with false information, would never be
possible, creating surreal utilities and more costs to all users. In chapter 4 an example
of how dishonest behaviors and false biddings cause imbalances in the system, and
therefore higher costs, is shown.
3.4 Algorithm Complexity During the Calculation of the
Feasible Landing Sequences
Assuming a landing sequence as an allocation of time-space resources, to find the op-
timal solution (i.e., the landing sequence that maximizes the social welfare) or to gen-
erate feasible landing sequences, the following model can be used.
Parameters
F = {1, ..., f} Set of flights affected by UDPP.
TW = {1, ..., t+ 1} Time Window of UDPP, i.e., the set of available TVUs. The last element represents DivAlt.
ELTi , ∀i ∈ F Earliest Landing Time of flight i.
LLTi , ∀i ∈ F Latest Landing Time of flight i.
LndFeei , ∀i ∈ F Landing Fee charged to flight i.
Sepik , ∀i, k ∈ F Time-based minimal separation between flights i and k.
Ui→j , ∀i ∈ F ,∀j ∈ TW The bid placed by user i on TVU j.
Variables
Lndij , ∀i ∈ F , ∀j ∈ TW Binary variable. 1 if flight i lands at TVU j, 0 otherwise.
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maximize Us = ∑
i∈F
∑
j∈TW
Lndij ·Ui→j +∑
i∈F
t
∑
j=1
Lndij · LndFeei (1)
subject to:
∑
j∈TW
Lndij = 1 , ∀i ∈ F (2)
∑
i∈F
Lndij ≤ 1 , ∀j ∈ {1, ..., t} (3)
ELTi−1
∑
j=1
Lndij = 0 , ∀i ∈ F , ∀ELTi > 1 (4)
t
∑
j=LLTi+1
Lndij = 0 , ∀i ∈ F , ∀LLTi < t (5)
Lndij · Lndkl · [(l − j)− Sepik] ≥ 0 , ∀i, k ∈ F , ∀i 6= k , ∀j, l ∈ {1, ..., t} , ∀l > i (6)
The optimization function (1) is a summatory of the utilities associated to their landing
slots (or the deviation to an alternative airport) plus the utility of the airport.
Constraint (2) ensures that each user has no more than one TVU allocated (which will
be the starting time of the landing slot) and constraint (3) that each TVU is only al-
located to maximum one user. Constraints (4) and (5) guarantee that any user gets a
TVU allocated outside of its range. Finally, constraint (6) guarantees that the time-
based separation between flights is within the minimums.
However, this problem is NP-Hard (which is the main problem attributed to combi-
natorial auctions) and therefore the number of feasible combinations can rapidly be-
come untreatable. Therefore, the proposed UDPP model will assume the landing
sequences as given. On the one hand, the airport, by the use of AMAN, will generate
landing sequences in which the capacity and the revenues are maximized. On the other
hand, the NM will generate landing sequences by exploring the Pareto efficient solu-
tions frontier (i.e., feasible landing sequences in which any user can improve without
making worse to others).
Further research is required in order to determine a method to generate feasible land-
ing sequences by the use of heuristics and Pareto efficient solutions frontier explo-
ration.
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3.5 Congestion Fees and Compensation Refunds
The sudden loss of capacity in the airport might generate costs to all the airspace users
and also to the airport, thus causing a loss of social welfare in relation to the situation
previous to the loss of capacity. Let define the social utility of the sequence scheduled
before the perturbation occurrence and UDPP activation as U∗S , and the social utility
obtained after negotiation and reallocation of resources as U
′
S. The social welfare re-
duction ratio is defined as ∇Us = U
′
S
U∗S
, ∈ {0, 1}, which gives information about the
percentual reduction of social welfare (expressed in parts per unit).
In order to reach an equitable situation, these individual costs and externalities
should be socialized and shared equally among all the agents that are affected di-
rectly or indirectly by the capacity reduction.
In addition to the price (LndFee) charged to users for the landing slot, which is assumed
to be previously established and negotiated with the airport, some users will also be
charged with a Congestion Fee (CongFeei, ∀i ∈ F), imposed by the NM in order to
ensure the efficient allocation of TVUs and to compensate the other airspace users and
the airport, that might be affected by negative externalities caused by the consumption
of TVUs. The NM could be in charge of calculating the Congestion Fees imposed on
each of the auction winners. Each of the flights will be charged with different Conges-
tion Fees, as they will be computed taking into account their utility for the allocated
slot or the amount they are willing to pay for it.
The revenues obtained by the NM from the Congestion Fees will be used to pay a
Compensation Refund (Comp) to the users affected by negative externalities, in order
to compensate the individual costs derived from the allocation of TVUs to other users,
thus distributing the total social welfare loss in an equitable way. The idea is that
all the airspace users affected and the airport must assume an individual welfare
loss of the same proportion as the social welfare reduction. For that reason, a virtual
utility is calculated, which is expressed as UEi = U
∗
i · ∇US, ∀i ∈ F, and referred as the
Equitable Utility for flight i. It represents the utility that the users should obtain after
the UDPP protocol to be fair.
Figure 3.9 shows an example of how the Congestion Fees charged to users may com-
pensate other users in order to achieve an equitable reduction in utility.
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3.6. CASH FLOWS AMONG AGENTS IN THE UDPP MARKET
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Figure 3.9: Example of Compensations.
3.6 Cash Flows Among Agents in the UDPP Market
In this model, some economic concepts like utility, fees and compensations are ad-
dressed. In this work, the utility of an user means the representation of the amount
that the user would be willing to pay to get the allocation of a good. A fee is the price
that a user pays as a remuneration for services and/or for the right to use a resource.
In this model, LndFee (i.e., the fee that a user has to pay in order to get the right to use
a runway) and CongFee (i.e., a fee paid in order to guarantee the equitable and effi-
cient allocation of resources) concepts are treated. A refund, like Comp, is a restitution,
sometimes partial, of a value used to reach a fair equilibrium and to align incentives.
These concepts need to be expressed in currency units. In this model, the unit used
will be Monetary Units (m.u.).
The payment and charge of taxes or refunds generates a flow of m.u. between the
agents involved in the UDPP market (NM, Airport, AU). This payments and charges
can be cash or credit, within different payment terms. It is out of the scope of the this
project to determine the payment methods, being allowed any legal or virtual currency
without loss of model validity.
32
4. CASE STUDIES AND RESULTS
In this chapter, two scenarios are provided, representing two different possible situa-
tions, with an exhaustive detail on the steps taken in the algorithm in each case.
4.1 Scenario 1: Normal Market Performance
The proposed scenario consists of 4 flights affected by a capacity fall. The TW is 8
TVUs long.3
Suppose that the airport charges the following landing fees to flights:
Flight 1 2 3 4
LndFee 150 100 100 50
Each flight submits the utility values for each TVU after paying the landing fees and
also for the option of diverting to an alternative airport:
TVUs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 DivAlt
Flight 1 875 1000 1250 1200 1000 1000 875 800 180
Flight 2 1000 875 750 625 680 750 940 1000 125
Flight 3 905 925 950 960 1000 900 800 625 125
Flight 4 280 300 325 350 375 375 300 280 125
3Units are not realistic in this example as they are expressed only for explanatory purpose.
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4.1. SCENARIO 1: NORMAL MARKET PERFORMANCE
Suppose that the original landing sequence before the capacity reduction was LSeq∗ =
[(2 → 1), (1 → 3), (4 → 4), (3 → 6)]. According to the values given by the airspace
users, the social welfare or utility can be calculated as:
U∗S = U2→1 +U1→3 +U4→4 +U3→6 +UApt(LSeq∗)
U∗S = 1000+ 1250+ 350+ 900+ (150+ 100+ 100+ 50) = 3900 m.u.
Next, an exploration on different combination of landing sequences has to be done, i
order to find the new optimal. Suppose that AMAN of the airport suggests landing
sequences LSeq1, LSeq2, and LSeq3, which are optimal from the point of view of the
airport. Also, NM suggests LSeq4, which has been calculated from the preferences
expressed by users. The landing sequences are:
LSeq1 = [(4→ 1), (2→ 3), (1→ 6)]
LSeq2 = [(1→ 1), (3→ 5), (4→ 8)]
LSeq3 = [(3→ 1), (4→ 5), (2→ 7)]
LSeq4 = [(1→ 3), (2→ 8)]
The utility that the airport perceives from this sequences are:
UApt(LSeq1) = LndFee4 + LndFee2 + LndFee1 = 50+ 100+ 150 = 300 m.u.
UApt(LSeq2) = LndFee1 + LndFee3 + LndFee4 = 150+ 100+ 50 = 300 m.u.
UApt(LSeq3) = LndFee3 + LndFee4 + LndFee2 = 100+ 50+ 100 = 250 m.u.
UApt(LSeq4) = LndFee1 + LndFee2 = 150+ 100 = 250 m.u.
Once all information is collected, the social utility corresponding to each sequence can
be calculated:
ULSeq1S = U4→1 +U2→3 +U1→6 +U3→DivAlt +UApt(LSeq1)
ULSeq1S = 280+ 750+ 1000+ 125+ 300 = 2455 m.u.
ULSeq2S = U1→1 +U3→5 +U4→8 +U2→DivAlt +UApt(LSeq2)
ULSeq2S = 875+ 1000+ 280+ 125+ 3500 = 2580 m.u.
ULSeq3S = U3→1 +U4→5 +U2→7 +U1→DivAlt +UApt(LSeq3)
ULSeq3S = 905+ 375+ 940+ 180+ 250 = 2650 m.u.
ULSeq4S = U1→3 +U2→8 +U3→DivAlt +U4→DivAlt +UApt(LSeq4)
ULSeq4S = 1250+ 1000+ 125+ 125+ 250 = 2750 m.u.
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4.2. SCENARIO 2: ONE USER PLACES FALSE BIDS
The maximum social utility is given by LSeq4, so it is going to be the sequence imple-
mented. However, some users have a higher individual cost, so compensations have
to be calculated to socialize this costs.
U
′
S = U
LSeq4
S
∇US = U
′
S
U∗S
= 27503900 = 0, 7
All users and the airport should assume an individual welfare loss of the same pro-
portion as the social welfare reduction. The utility that users and airport should obtain
after UDPP protocol to be fair (Equitable Utility) is:
UE1 = U
∗
1 ·∇US = 1250 · 0, 7 = 875 m.u.
UE2 = U
∗
2 ·∇US = 1000 · 0, 7 = 700 m.u.
UE3 = U
∗
3 ·∇US = 900 · 0, 7 = 630 m.u.
UE4 = U
∗
4 ·∇US = 350 · 0, 7 = 245 m.u.
UEApt = U
∗
Apt·∇US = 400 · 0, 7 = 280 m.u.
Finally, balancing Equitable with current utilities, the Congestion Fees are calculated:
CongFee1 = U
′
1 −UE1 = 1250− 875 = 375 m.u.
CongFee2 = U
′
2 −UE2 = 1000− 700 = 300 m.u.
CongFee3 = U
′
3 −UE3 = 125− 630 = −505 m.u.
CongFee4 = U
′
4 −UE4 = 125− 245 = −120 m.u.
CongFeeApt = U
′
Apt −UEApt = 250− 280 = −30 m.u.
Note that users 1 and 2 have a positive CongFee. That means that their current utility
is higher than it should be for the UDPP protocol to be fair. Then, they will pay this
amount in order to compensate users with individual costs (externalities). Users 3 and
4 and the airport have a negative CongFee. That means that their current utility is lower
than it should be for UDPP protocol to be fair, so user they will receive a compensation
from the other users. Note that CongFee = −Comp.
4.2 Scenario 2: One User Places False Bids
This scenario is the same than the previous example, but consider that user 4 cheats in
the biding process in order to avoid the implementation of LSeq4 (in which the user 4
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4.2. SCENARIO 2: ONE USER PLACES FALSE BIDS
is forced to divert to an alternative airport) and lead the system to the implementation
of LSeq3, which is a scenario that reports higher utility to user 4, i.e., 375.
First, user 4 cheats in the bidding of diverting to an alternative airport:
UFalse4→DivAlt = 50 m.u. < U
∗
4→DivAlt = 125 m.u.
The consequence of this is that the social welfare or utility calculated by the NM for
LSeq4, is lower than the real one:
UFalse LSeq4S = 2675 < U
True LSeq4
S = 2750 m.u.
Second, user 4 also places false bids in the valuation of theTVUs, giving higher values:
UFalse4→5 = 440 > U
∗
4→5 = 375
The consequence of this higher valuation is that the social welfare or utility calculated
by the NM for LSeq3, is higher than the real one:
UFalse LSeq3S = 2715 > U
True LSeq3
S = 2650
Since UFalse LSeq3S > U
False LSeq4
S , the NM takes the LSeq3 as the better option to maxi-
mize the social welfare or utility.
∇UFalseS =
U
′ False
S
U∗S
= 27153990 = 0, 68
Now, the equitable utilities are calculated:
UE False1 = U
∗
1 ·∇UFalseS = 1250 · 0, 68 = 850 m.u.
UE False2 = U
∗
2 ·∇UFalseS = 1000 · 0, 68 = 680 m.u
UE False3 = U
∗
3 ·∇UFalseS = 900 · 0, 68 = 612 m.u
UE False4 = U
∗
4 ·∇UFalseS = 440 · 0, 68 = 299 m.u
UE FalseApt = U
∗
Apt·∇UFalseS = 400 · 0, 68 = 272 m.u
Finally, the Congestion Fees are calculated:
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4.2. SCENARIO 2: ONE USER PLACES FALSE BIDS
CongFeeFalse1 = U
′ False
1 −UE False1 = 180− 850 = −670 m.u
CongFeeFalse2 = U
′ False
2 −UE False2 = 940− 680 = 260 m.u
CongFeeFalse3 = U
′ False
3 −UE False3 = 905− 612 = 293 m.u
CongFeeFalse4 = U
′ False
4 −UE False4 = 440− 299 = 141 m.u
CongFeeFalseApt = U
′ False
Apt −UE FalseApt = 250− 272 = −22 m.u
Note that after the compensation, user 4 obtains a real utility of:
UReal4 = 375− 141 = 234
In this case, user 4 obtains a loss. In scenarios in which some agents do not tell the
truth, real utility will also be lower than the normal performance (true bids) and also
lower to the Equitable Utility.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This work has presented a model based in combinatorial auctions for Demand and
Capacity Balancing through the UDPP protocol, where users and airports can bid
for the available resources, which are allocated to those users who value them the
most, achieving the maximum social welfare and an equitable distribution of negative
externalities produced by the resource allocation.
As seen in the case studies, the algorithm achieves an optimum allocation, within the
existing constraints (i.e., the time-based separation minimums between aircraft and the
autonomy range of flights), if users provide real valorations. The compensation system
can be used to socialize the costs, thus guarenteeing an equitable allocation, but also
acts as a force to align user’s incentive to act in a collaborative way and to always
reveal their true willingness to pay for the achievement of the resource allocation with
higher social utility. More research is needed to better understand the forces that affect
the behavior of market agents.
Also, an integer programming model is provided, which allows creating feasible land-
ing sequences, however, it is an NP-Hard problem, which indeed is a common short-
age of combinatorial auctions. Therefore, to solve this problem, landing sequences are
considered in the model as given by AMAN and the NM. More research has to be
done in order to analyze different ways of how the NM can explore the Pareto efficient
solutions frontier to generate landing sequences.
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Nomenclature
A-CDM Airport CDM
AMAN Arrival Manager
ANSP Air Navigation Service Providers
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATFCM Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management
ATM Air Traffic Management
AU Airspace User
BDT Business Development Trajectory
BT Business Trajectory
CD&R Conflict Detection and Resolution
CDM Collaborative Decision Making
CFMU Central Flow Management Unit
CTA Controlled Time of Arrival
CTO Controlled Time Over
DCB Demand and Capacity Balancing
DMAN Departure Manager
EC European Comission
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival
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FAB Functional Airspace Block
FMS Flight Management System
FPFS First Planned, First Served
FPL Flight Plan
KPA Key Performance Areas
NM Network Manager
NOP Network Operations Plan
RBT Reference Business Trajectory
SBT Shared Business Trajectory
SES Single European Sky
SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research
SMAN Surface Manager
SWIM System Wide Information Management
TMR Trajectory Management Requirements
TTA Target Time of Arrival
UDPP User Driven Priorisation Process
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